Serving and Subpoenaing Chinese Defendants Requires Compliance with Hague Conventions

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Serving Chinese Defendants in U.S. Litigation: Hague Service Convention, Rule 4(f)(3), Rule 45, and Chinese Translation Requirements

Imagine spending months preparing a federal lawsuit against a Chinese manufacturer, obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO), serving documents translated from English to Simplified Chinese by email, securing a default judgment—and then watching your entire case unravel because service of process was improper.  That devastating scenario is no longer hypothetical.  If your case involves serving a defendant located in mainland China, recent appellate decisions make compliance with the Hague Service Convention more important than ever. In this article we discuss the impact of Smart Study (2d Cir. 2025) and Kangol (7th Cir. 2026), the unknown address exception, distinguish Rule 4 service from Rule 45 subpoenas, and explain why certified Chinese translations are essential to successful Hague Services Convention requests.

If you need to serve a defendant located in mainland China, recent federal appellate decisions have fundamentally changed the legal landscape. The Second Circuit in Smart Study (2025) and the Seventh Circuit in Kangol (2026) held that plaintiffs generally cannot rely on email service under Rule 4(f)(3) when the Hague Service Convention applies. These decisions affect Schedule A litigation, intellectual property disputes, international commercial litigation, cross-border fraud cases, and any lawsuit involving defendants located in China.

In Smart Study (2d Cir. 2025) and Kangol (7th Cir. 2026), the federal appellate courts overseeing the nation’s busiest counterfeiting dockets held that where the Hague Service Convention applies, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4(f)(3) cannot authorize email service of process on defendants in mainland China, which puts default judgments at risk and shifts the fight to the Hague Service Convention’s “unknown address” exception. Rule 45’s territorial limits are tightening in parallel, and a subpoena still cannot reach a non-party in China, where evidence must be sought through the Hague Evidence Convention or letters rogatory.

How Email Service Became the Default in Schedule A Cases

For nearly a decade, brand owners suing Chinese e-commerce sellers in federal court relied on a shortcut: obtain court permission to serve the summons and complaint by email under FRCP 4(f)(3), skip the slow trip through China’s Ministry of Justice, and move quickly to a TRO, an asset freeze, and a default judgment.

Two recent appellate decisions have shut that door. In Smart Study Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164 (2d Cir. 2025), and Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd., 177 F.4th 793 (7th Cir. 2026), the Second and Seventh Circuits held that the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by email on defendants in mainland China. Default judgments obtained through email service are now vulnerable to vacatur as void.

A Quick Refresher: Rule 4(f) and the Hague Service Convention

Rule 4(f) governs service on defendants abroad. Rule 4(f)(1) points to “internationally agreed means” such as the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. Rule 4(f)(3), the provision plaintiffs invoked for email service, allows service by “other means not prohibited by international agreement.” The question is deceptively simple: the Convention never mentions email, so is email “prohibited”? District courts split for years. Some reasoned that silence means permission; others held that the Convention is exclusive meaning that where it applies, it lists the only lawful methods of service, and anything not on the list is off the table.

Smart Study: The Second Circuit Closes the Loophole

Smart Study, the South Korean company behind the “Baby Shark” franchise, sued dozens of China-based sellers over counterfeit products. With the district court’s blessing, it served the defendants by email using addresses obtained from Amazon, then moved for a default judgment. The district court concluded that email service violated the Convention and ultimately dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for failure to serve.

The Second Circuit affirmed, deciding the issue as a matter of first impression, and its reasoning rests on three pillars. First, the Convention is a “closed universe.” Drawing on the treaty’s text, its structure, and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Schlunk and Water Splash, the court held that the Convention specifies the approved methods of service and preempts inconsistent ones wherever it applies; reading its silence on email as implicit permission would render the approved methods meaningless. Second, China’s objection under Article 10 controls. Even if email were a form of “postal channel” under Article 10(a), that provision applies only where the destination state does not object — and China has formally objected to every Article 10 method. Third, there is no urgency escape hatch. Even where Hague service is likely to be slow or unsuccessful, compliance is mandatory in every case to which the Convention applies, and Rule 4(f)(2) offers no alternative route, since it operates only where no internationally agreed means exists.

Kangol: The Seventh Circuit Aligns

Smart Study announced the rule, Kangol showed its consequences. Kangol LLC, the hat maker known for its kangaroo logo, filed a Schedule A case in the Northern District of Illinois against 25 vendors, including Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co. The court authorized email service, Hangzhou never appeared, and a default judgment was entered. Kangol then collected part of the judgment from Hangzhou’s Amazon account — and only then did Hangzhou appear and move to vacate the judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4). The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of that motion, and three aspects of its opinion deserve close attention.

To begin with, a defaulting defendant can wait. Applying the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton, the court held Hangzhou’s motion timely even though it came ten months after the default judgment, because Hangzhou filed within about two months of learning that Kangol had enforced the judgment. Months of failed settlement talks, standing alone, waived nothing. Additionally, an emailed hyperlink is still “service of process.” Kangol argued the Convention did not apply because its email merely linked to a website containing the complaint, TRO, and summons; the court found this argument “hardly credible,” holding that formal delivery of documents sufficient to charge the defendant with notice is service, whether by attachment or link. Finally, agreeing expressly with Smart Study, the Seventh Circuit held that the Convention is exclusive: no provision authorizes email service in China — and China has objected to Article 10’s postal channels in any event — so email service violates the Convention and, by extension, Rule 4(f)(3).

The two decisions arrive at the same conclusion albeit from opposite directions. In Smart Study, a plaintiff appealed a dismissal for failure to serve and lost, leaving it with no judgment at all. In Kangol, a defendant appealed the denial of its motion to vacate a default judgment and won a remand, placing a judgment the plaintiff had already begun collecting in jeopardy. Together they show that the exclusivity rule bites at both ends of a case. It can block a judgment from ever being entered, and it can unwind one years later.

The “Unknown Address” Exception

Neither circuit held that email service on Chinese sellers is impossible in every case, and this is where the battle precisely has moved. Article 1 provides that the Convention “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” If the Convention does not apply, its prohibitions fall away, and Rule 4(f)(3) email service comes back into play, so long as the method is reasonably calculated to give notice.

Kangol squarely tees up this question. Kangol had asserted that diligent investigation produced only conflicting addresses, for “stalls at an open-air market,” while Hangzhou insisted its address was easily discoverable. Because the district court had skipped the question, the Seventh Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the Convention applies at all, noting the standard district courts typically apply in Schedule A cases: reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain and verify the defendant’s mailing address.

Smart Study’s own procedural history shows the exception’s power. After email service was barred, Smart Study renewed its default judgment motion as to forty-nine defendants whose addresses it could not obtain despite reasonable diligence — and the court granted it, awarding $2.45 million in statutory damages. Only the two defendants with arguably known addresses were dismissed. The unknown-address exception is not a footnote; it is the main event, and what counts as “reasonable diligence” will define the next wave of Schedule A appeals.

A Narrow Carve-Out for Emergencies: Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico

Can a plaintiff ever get urgent relief in front of a foreign defendant without months of Central Authority processing? A recent decision says yes, but within careful limits. In Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026), Fox obtained a TRO against its former Mexican broadcast licensee and, with court authorization, emailed it. Facing contempt, a related entity argued, citing Smart Study, that electronic service on a Mexican entity violated the Convention, since Mexico, like China, has objected to Article 10.

The court distinguished Smart Study on two grounds. First, Article 15’s final sentence preserves a judge’s authority to “order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures”, and a TRO fits that description far more naturally than the final default judgment at issue in Smart Study. Second, no default judgment rested on the challenged transmission; the only question was whether a defendant with undisputed actual notice could defy a TRO. The court added that a foreign party bound by a U.S. forum selection clause should not be able to use months of Central Authority processing to evade the jurisdiction to which it consented.

Two cautions are in order. Fox Corp. is a district court decision which is persuasive, not binding. Additionally, commentators have questioned whether Article 15 authorizes otherwise-forbidden service methods at all. Its logic is deliberately narrow as it addresses notice of urgent provisional relief, not service of the summons and complaint. Emergency TRO practice may be able to proceed on electronic notice, but perfecting jurisdiction for a final judgment still requires Hague Service Convention-compliant service.

Meanwhile, Rule 45’s Limits Are Tightening Too

The instinct behind Smart Study and Kangol, i.e., that technology does not silently expand a court’s territorial reach, is also playing out under Rule 45, which governs subpoenas. In In re Kirkland, 75 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2023), the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 45(c)’s 100-mile limitation applies even when a witness testifies remotely by video. Just as email cannot substitute for Hague service, a video link cannot transport a trial to wherever the witness sits.

Any material change to subpoena power must be made by the rulemakers. In August 2025, the Judicial Conference published proposed amendments to Rule 45(c) confirming nationwide subpoena power for remote testimony so long as the witness need not travel more than 100 miles. The comment period closed February 16, 2026.

Critically, none of this extends Rule 45 abroad. A Rule 45 subpoena still cannot be served on a foreign national or entity outside the United States as 28 U.S.C. § 1783’s narrow exception reaches only U.S. nationals and residents abroad. Discovery from a party or non-party in mainland China still runs through the Hague Evidence Convention or letters rogatory, which are subject to China’s restrictive Article 23 declaration and not Rule 45. Whether the document is a summons or a subpoena, U.S. procedural shortcuts stop at the border.

Litigants Must Plan Ahead

For plaintiffs, the lesson is to plan, not improvise. If a Chinese defendant’s address is known or reasonably ascertainable, formal Hague service through China’s Ministry of Justice is the only safe path, and it requires a complete Chinese translation of every document served, as China’s Article 5(3) declaration demands. Budget for the delay, and document address-verification efforts meticulously, because any later invocation of the unknown-address exception will rise or fall on that record. Plaintiffs seeking emergency relief should note that electronic notice of a TRO may stand on firmer ground under Article 15’s urgency clause, as in Fox Corp.

For defendants, a default judgment obtained through email service in China is a candidate for vacatur as void under Rule 60(b)(4), and settlement discussions alone do not waive the objection. Defendants, however, should not sit on the issue once enforcement begins, e.g., Kangol’s defendant moved within two months of the first collection. Also, every litigant should expect secondary litigation over what counts as a “known” address, watch the pending Rule 45 amendments, and remember that judgments premised on service methods China rejected face an added obstacle if they ever need enforcement in China itself.

English to Simplified Chinese Translation Is a Hague Service Requirement

With the email shortcut foreclosed, the path to a valid judgment against a Chinese defendant with a known address runs through China’s Central Authority and requires certified translation of the summons, complaint, and supporting documents into Chinese. A defective translation gives the Central Authority grounds to reject the request, adding months to an already slow process. The same discipline applies to Hague Evidence Convention requests, which must be narrow and accurately translated from English to Simplified Chinese to have a realistic chance of execution.

Cases Discussed:

Smart Study Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164 (2d Cir. 2025);

Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd., 177 F.4th 793 (7th Cir. 2026);

Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026); and

In re Kirkland, 75 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2023).

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